Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal
Volume 11
Number 2 Summer 2020

Article 3

Summer 2020

The Antitrust Impact of Venture Capital Firms on Concentration in
the Technology Sector
Bushra Samimi

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_science_technology_law_journal
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bushra Samimi, The Antitrust Impact of Venture Capital Firms on Concentration in the Technology Sector,
11 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 155 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol11/iss2/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC
Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

2 - BUSHRA_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/4/2020 11:24 AM

The Antitrust Impact of Venture Capital
Firms on Concentration in the
Technology Sector
BUSHRA SAMIMI
University of California Hastings, College of the Law
Advisor: Jared Ellias
Abstract
Technology plays a significant and crucial role in the current global
economy. It impacts consumer welfare, the job market, economic progress,
and the emergence of innovative technology. Due to the fact that the
technology sector provides necessary and critical services, technology
companies exercise immense power over consumers who rely on their
products. The rising concentration in the technology sector magnifies the
potential anticompetitive forces at play. This article argues that venture
capital financing leads to anticompetitive effects in the technology industry.
Although most startups intend to eventually go public through an initial
public offering (“IPO”), the liquidity pressures from venture capital firms
positions startups for an acquisition. Under these circumstances, venture
capital policies create economic opportunities for tech giants to swoop in and
acquire startups. This escalation in M&A activity in the technology space
increases the market power of tech giants such as Google, Facebook, and
Amazon. The result is a highly concentrated technology market which stunts
innovation, heightens barriers to entry into the market, and reduces consumer
welfare.

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that venture capitalist’s
behavior gives rise to anticompetitive conduct in tech because it enhances
the dominance of tech giants through M&A. This Note has three major parts:
Part 1 explains how VCs induce startups to sell, Part 2 describes the legal
framework for antitrust and bridges the connection between VCs and M&A
[155]
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activity, and Part 3 outlines a remedy for strengthening merger enforcement
and potentially altering VC behavior towards startups in the tech industry.
Technology startups increasingly view themselves as auditioning for
sales to technology giants rather than creating long-term viable businesses.
Corporate consolidation in tech deals is changing the startup ecosystem.
Apple acquired Beats by Dre for $3 billion, Cisco bought AppDynamics at
$3.7 billion a day before it was set to go public, Amazon purchased Whole
Foods for $13.7 billion, and Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram amounted
to $1 billion while its acquisition of WhatsApp totaled $22 billion.1 IBM
topped this all off with the largest software M&A through its acquisition of
Red Hat for $34 billion. These MegaTech deals indicate that lucrative
acquisitions are becoming a more typical occurrence in the startup
ecosystem.2
For technology giants, these sorts of acquisitions of early stage firms
serve the dual purposes of growth and disabling potential competitors. For
instance, Applied Insight, an AI company, grew its revenue to $140 million
and expanded to 500 employees through the acquisition of Applied
Technology Group.3 Similarly, Aquicore, a commercial real estate software
developer, acquired Entic.4 With this acquisition, Aquicore has been able to
expand to Florida, Massachusetts, and California and grow its team by an
additional 65 employees.5
Federal regulators are beginning to examine the anti-competitive
aspects of these types of deals, but it is not obvious that current antitrust law
has much to say about them even though they threaten to concentrate
consumer data in a relatively small number of hands. The FTC has noted
that it is time to “closely examine technology markets to ensure consumers
benefit from free and fair competition.”6 However, mergers are not
inherently harmful or anticompetitive and simply possessing monopoly

1. Todd Campbell, 9 Near Monopolies That Are Legal in America, THE MOTLEY FOOL
(July 3, 2018), https://www.fool.com/slideshow/9-near-monopolies-are-legal-america/.
2. Alastair Rimmer, Tech Deals Bring New Challenges to M&A, STRATEGY+BUSINESS
(May 16, 2018), https://www.strategy-business.com/article/Tech-Deals-Bring-New-Challen
ges-to-M-A.
3. Michelai Graham, M&A Moves: These 3 DC-area Companies are Growing Via
Acquisition, TECHNICAL.LY (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://technical.ly/dc/2019/03/27/
these-3-dc-area-companies-are-growing-via-acquisition.
4. Id.
5. Graham, supra note 3.
6. FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/
02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology.

2 - BUSHRA_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2020]

ANTITRUST IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS

6/4/2020 11:24 AM

157

power is not sufficient to establish a violation of antitrust laws.7 Moreover,
antitrust analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry driven by the mechanics and
market structure of the particular industry.8 Congress intended mergers to be
viewed in light of industry qualities such as trends towards domination by a
few leaders, barriers of entry to new companies, and access to the market.9
Here, the tech industry is becoming increasingly consolidated and controlled
by a few key players.10 Thus, antitrust should look beyond relevant market
share data because the large tech companies’ strength lies in the way they
leverage consumer data to gain power and eliminate competition.
Part 1. The Role of VCs in the Startup Ecosystem
The evolution of the technology sector began in the Silicon Valley in
the 1970s of Silicon Valley and was accompanied by the development of a
new type of financing provided by a new type of institutional investor:
venture capitalists.11 Venture capital funding significantly contributed to
funding and building Apple, eBay, Yahoo, Google, and Facebook. Because
banks were more risk averse than venture capitalists, startups relied on
venture capital funding. As a result, it accelerated innovation and
technological progress in Silicon Valley and the tech market.12 Corporate
governance presents a fitting environment to unveil the ways in which
different startup players’ conflicting interests affect exit strategy, the power
that VCs yield over startups, and how VCs use that power to induce startups
to sell.
As an asset class, venture capital has evolved to what is described as
high-risk private investment, usually in the form of a type of equity, in
young, putatively high-growth businesses.13 VCs provide substantial funds,

7. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
8. Id. at 411.
9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
10. America’s Concentration Crisis, OPEN MARKETS INST. (June 2019), https://concen
trationcrisis.openmarketsinstitute.org.
11. Team Wall Street Survivor, The History of Silicon Valley: Start-ups and Their
Forefathers, WALL STREET SURVIVOR (Feb. 22, 2017), https://blog.wallstreetsurvivor.com/
2017/02/22/history-of-silicon-valley.
12. Starting Up: Silicon Valley’s Origins, NPR (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:20 AM), https://www.
npr.org/transcripts/149992521?storyId=149992521.
13. What is Venture Capital? THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/
venture-capital.

2 - BUSHRA_HSTLJ11-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

158

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

6/4/2020 11:24 AM

[Vol. 11:2

as well as managerial and technical expertise for emerging companies.14
Although these deals are very risky for investors, there is a strong potential
for high returns. Over the years, VCs have become a fundamental part of the
startup ecosystem and a major source for startups to raise capital. VC funding
is more widely available than other funding like private equity or bank loans
which is crucial to startups attempting to begin or grow their businesses. In
spite of its pivotal role in the accelerated growth of Silicon Valley and
technological innovation, other challenges have arisen.
The provision of access to capital comes at the cost of startup founders
losing equity in the company and the loss of independence.15 The loss of
equity by founders occurs because venture capital funds are bound by duties
to their limited partners. Money invested in the fund is used to buy shares in
high risk high reward startups which the VC firms hope will turn a
substantial profit.16 Because of the high-risk nature of the investment, VC
firms gain ownership and agency in the business decisions of startups. This
allows them to ensure the security of their investments by actively providing
guidance and often requesting board positions. Thus, with the gradual influx
of capital, founders lose equity and decision-making power in the future of
the startup at each stage of the financing.
There are three main pathways to liquidate VC investment and reap the
gains: 1) by IPO, 2) acquisition or 3) dissolution. Not only has the IPO
market weakened, but regulatory measures like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 make IPOs more costly for emerging companies in the startup tech
space. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes heightened compliance
requirements which influence startups to abstain from going public. With the
weakening of the IPO market, and dissolution truly an unsavory and unviable
option, mergers have become the preferred liquidation event.
VCs cultivate incredible influence over a startup through ownership and
board representation. As preferred stock shareholders, the VCs interests are
protected through contractual rights requiring their approval for certain
transactions. This gives them privileges over the common-stockholders and
opportunities to appoint VC-approved board members. The cash flow rights
of preferred stock incentivize VCs to concentrate more on liquidation in the

14. James Chen, Venture Capital, Investopedia (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp.
15. What is VC Funding? Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.up
counsel.com/what-is-vc-funding.
16. Gary J. Ross, How Venture Capital Funds Work, ABOVE THE LAW (June 15, 2017,
3:03 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/06/how-venture-capital-funds-work/?rf=1.
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short term rather than the sustainability of the company in the long run.17
Preferred stockholders can even invest in future financing rounds, giving
them more authority and ownership in the company.18
Staged investments affect the balance of power in the early stage of
venture-backed startups. Typically, venture capitalists acquire majority votes
and protection rights through each round of financing.19 VCs are able to
acquire such power by leveraging the startup entrepreneurial team’s need for
additional financing because initial investments are often not enough to
jumpstart the business and fully develop the idea or product.20 As a result,
the startup founders dilute their ownership rights in subsequent early stages
of funding.21 To illustrate the evolution of emerging startups, the pattern of
shifting control from founders to investors happens within the first few
rounds of venture financing.22 Startup entrepreneurs play easily into the
hands of VCs and inadvertently surrender control because they are motivated
to complete their innovative project, and they fear that without VC funding,
the startup will fail. The future of the startups depends upon the VC’s
decision to either continue to fund the project, and in the process gain more
power in the company, or to abandon the startup altogether.23 Staged
investments formally and informally function to make startups and their
founders ultimately comply with exit strategies favorable to VC interests.
This occurs because venture capital has limited partnerships to whom they
owe a fiduciary duty to vest the money, usually in ten-year term investments.
This informs VCs interest in desiring to liquidate the fund’s portfolio as soon
as possible.24 Therefore, each round of staged financing enables VCs to
accumulate significant authority within the startups to drive it towards an
M&A exit.
VCs attempt to gain a foothold in startup boards in order to control key
strategic decisions and dictate the future of the company. Startup boards

17. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 987–88 (2006).
18. Venture Capital Definitions: Common v. Preferred Shares, ALACRITY CANADA
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.alacritycanada.com/2016/08/04/venture-capital-definitions-com
mon-v-preferred-shares/.
19. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323–
24 (2005).
20. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1072–75 (2003).
21. Supra note 19, 323–24.
22. Elizabeth Pullman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 181(2019).
23. Supra note 20, 1072–75.
24. Id. at 1072–75.
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function uniquely in that the board members heavily participate in the
decision-making process and actively engage in the operation of the
startup.25 As VCs gain control over the board through each round of
financing, VCs attain power and influence to make key critical decisions in
how to allocate their investment and dictate the startups’ growth goals.
Specifically, VCs obtain the ability to block unfavorable transactions, and to
initiate and influence the acquisition route as a means of liquidation.26 In
addition, studies show that in VC backed startups one-fifth of the startup
founders are replaced.27 Moreover, swing votes in VC supported startups are
held by independent directors, chosen by both the VCs and common
stockholders.28 These board members interests may align with the VCs,
thereby granting significant autonomy and power to VCs to push for
liquidation and mergers, as opposed to allowing a startup to operate
independently and grow sustainably. In essence, startup boards serve as an
illustration of the way in which VCs ensure that their interests in being
acquired prevail over the interests of startup entrepreneurs.
Corporate governance issues arising from VC-backed startups create
legal and economic scandals such that an M&A exit strategy becomes
preferable.29 VC-backed startups are pressured to scale quickly due to the
grow-at-all costs mentality fostered by VC funds. Since the structure of
staged financing does not provide sufficient time to raise revenue, valuations
rely on factors like: the portfolio of the entrepreneur, size of the market
opportunity, traction, progress towards a minimally viable product, capital
efficiency, and whether the company is hot.30 Also, each startup valuation
across Series-A, B, C, D, E funding is unique and assessed differently. Due
to the complexity and difficulty in ascertaining the valuation of a startup,
such valuations are considered to be a black box.31 Thus, valuations largely
depict an inaccurate snapshot of a startups true worth. This form of
25. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 987–88 (2006).
26. Id.
27. Michael Ewens & Matt Marx, Research: What Happens to a Startup When Venture
Capitalists Replace the Founder, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Feb. 14, 2018), https://hbr.
org/2018/02/research-what-happens-to-a-startup-when-venture-capitalists-replace-the-founder.
28. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, supra note 25 at 987–988.
29. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 181(2019).
30. Mike Sullivan & Richard D. Harroch, A Guide to Venture Capital Financings for
Startups, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2018/03/29/aguide-to-venture-capital-financings-for-startups/#15f9a77e51c9.
31. Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality,
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, forthcoming (Dec. 2, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955455.
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information asymmetry can manifest itself as a culture of quick,
unsustainable growth at the cost of compliance and good corporate
governance. VCs encourage (or rather demand) accelerated growth as a
means of staying afloat and gaining more funding.32 Founders use traction
and “fake it until you make it growth” to become a hot topic and increase
their valuation profile. Doing so plants the seed of corporate governance
dysfunction which inhibits founders from continuing to grow their company
privately and independently. It can also burden startups to the point where
IPO compliance costs are too heavy to bear. And even if attempts at scaling
the company in the name of growth do not kill the company, it can result in
harmful corporate scandals.33 Some of the major examples of startup
governance failures include: Zenefit, SoFi, Theranos, Uber, WrkRiot,
Skully, and Hampton Creek.
Although the structure of VC-backed startups provides VCs the ability
to facilitate startup maturity through monitoring, internal controls, and
screening processes, it is not enough. Simply acquiring more control and
ownership over startups does not prevent startups from being embroiled in
massive corporate scandals. For example, Zenefits’ employees were found
to be cheating on their insurance state brokerage exams. Zenefits is an online
software system automating health insurance and other essential office
services. Their product promised to streamline and reduce HR costs for
business around America.34 Initially, it appeared that Zenefits was the ideal
startup with a visionary founder, tapping into the health software space while
bringing in revenue through insurance brokerage commissions.35 In three
years, Zenefits expanded from fifteen employees to 1600 employees.36
However, this growth did not occur naturally, but from pressure to keep
expanding and moving faster. Zenefits soon realized that its place in the
market was not as secure as it believed because certain states banned the
product and other companies did not have the technological capacity to

32. Luke Kanies, If You Take Venture Capital, You’re Forcing Your Company to Exit,
MEDIUM (Nov. 9, 2017), https://medium.com/s/understanding-venture-capital/if-you-takeventure-capital-youre-forcing-your-company-to-exit-fc08fcdb32cc.
33. Renata Quintini, Growth at All Costs? It’s Gonna’ Cost You, MEDIUM (Apr. 10,
2018), https://medium.com/@renata.quintini/growth-at-all-costs-its-gonna-cost-you-821eb7
9c7f2f.
34. Claire Suddath & Eric Newcomer, Zenefits Was the Perfect Startup. Then It SelfDisrupted, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (May 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
features/2016-zenefits/.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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accommodate Zenefits’ services.37 Minimal diligence and screening led to
errors in insurance claims.38 On the operational level, there was no office
manager to address site issues.39 The founder was adamant in closely
managing HR decisions of Zenefits’ employees, a responsibility that should
have been deferred to the HR team in Zenefits. In addition to this internal
dysfunction, Zenefit’s insurance brokers were not properly licensed in their
respective states to sell or advise people on insurance plans.40 Since each
state had different insurance brokerage exams, and training requirements, it
would be costly to sell Zenefits products across the country.41 To cut costs
and bypass this licensing requirement, Zenefits created a Google Chrome
browser extension that made it seem as if Zenefits’ employees were working
on the course when they were not.42 Some Zenefit brokers did not even pass
these tests.43 There was no system in place to track which employees had
licenses or reciprocal licenses.44 The Zenefits case illustrates that such rapid
growth may be dangerous and unsustainable as it leads to corporate
governance failures. And, it shows that startups face unpredictable
challenges in building a sustainable business which should trigger scrutiny
and wariness of overly optimistic valuations.45
Another key example is Hampton Creek Foods, a Silicon Valley startup
producing plant-based food. It was a hot company with lots of traction and
products aimed at disrupting the biotech market.46 However, Hampton Creek
fell short of its promises and produced a number of corporate governance
failures. The startup overhyped its capabilities to investors and the market
by promising to deliver an impossible 43 new products.47 One of these
products, a cake mix, was proposed to garner the interest of a Walmart buyer.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Eric Newcomer, Predicting the Future Is Hard, Especially at a Startup. Just Ask
Zenefits, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/predictingthe-future-is-hard-especially-at-a-startup-just-ask-zenefits (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
46. Helen Holmes, Is This Embattled Start-Up the Theranos of Mayonnaise?, OBSERVER,
(Feb. 21, 2019, 1:03 PM), https://observer.com/2019/02/just-inc-mayonnaise-controversiestheranos-comparison/.
47. Monica Watrous, What Happened To Hampton Creek?, FOOD BUSINESS NEWS (Apr.
4, 2018), https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11575-what-happened-to-hampton-creek.
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The startup has since scaled back to more realistic product launch goals.48
Additionally, the startup was accused of artificially boosting sales of its
products by having employees buy its plant-based products from stores.
Moreover, Target removed Hampton Creek’s products from its stores after
allegations of food safety concerns. Employees anonymously tried to inform
the startup about the inaccurate nutritional and health claims, and the
misrepresentation of scientific research regarding its plant-based food
products.49 Also, the company’s board of directors all stepped down.
Because of these scandals, the company tried to rebrand itself as Just Inc.50
This case study demonstrates that rapid growth as a measure of viability puts
immense pressure on startups to rely upon exaggerated claims and
generating popularity as a means of maintaining VC support. In the process,
startups end up forsaking quality control, compliance, and best business
practices to satisfy VC interests.
Uber, another VC backed startup, engaged in an endless stream of
harmful corporate behavior. Aside from numerous rape and sexual
harassment rumors, Uber’s major corporate governance issues lie in their
questionable business practices. In August 2014, Uber attempted to
undermine its competitor Lyft by hiring independent contractors with burner
phones and credit cards to book thousands of fake rides.51 Uber repeated this
behavior with a competitor in New York City, Gett Ride. In New York City,
Uber’s contractors posed as pedestrians in order to poach drivers and cancel
scheduled rides. This type of spamming negatively impacts the competitors’
revenue by wasting their drivers’ time and spiking up the ride prices.
Furthermore, Uber misrepresented information about drivers’ potential
earnings which eventually led to a $20-million settlement with the FTC. To
circumvent cities’ local laws and regulations, Uber used Greyball to identify
and avoid sting operations where they committed violations. Uber also used
another tool called God View, which allowed them to track cars and gain
access to the personal information of drivers in the car. The use of this tool
was problematic because there was a lack of data and security protocols in
place. Thus, even after a huge data breach occurred, Uber was unable to
disclose and remedy the breach in a timely manner. Uber’s case illustrates
that VC investment, and the desire to raise capital is not always aligned with
48. Id.
49. Ian Agar, Just Inc. Raising $200M Amid Controversial Past, PITCHBOOK (Feb. 20,
2019), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/just-inc-raising-200-million-amid-controversial-past.
50. Id.
51. Sam Levin, Uber's Scandals, Blunders and PR disasters: The Full List, GUARDIAN
(June 27, 2019, 19,14 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/ubertravis-kalanick-scandal-pr-disaster-timeline.
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transparency and accountability. As long as a company is growing, and more
capital can be raised, VCs are content. With that being said, not every startup
will become a unicorn or become as large as Uber. This spells disaster for a
lot of young, emerging startups whose revenue stream cannot be realized as
easily or quickly as Uber’s ride hailing service was. Early stage innovative
startups take much longer than Uber to amass a stable revenue stream.
Consequently, startups will be induced to sell because it is unlikely that they
will achieve unicorn status or be highly profitable within the timeframe that
suits VC interests. In the process of pursuing exponential growth and unicorn
status, startups do not focus on compliance which can become costly and
burdensome to remedy as the startup expands. Uber is not the norm and
although they may have the capital to deal with compliance issues, many
startups will not have the same luxury which leaves them in a
disadvantageous position. Overall, this makes acquisitions far more
attractive and practical than IPOs for VCs and young startups.
The fact that VCs have been the strongest drivers of technological
innovation and growth in the startup ecosystem makes them an influential
part of startup culture. With the influx of VC capital flooding the startup
ecosystem, startups are pressured to “go big or go home.” Not only that, but
startup entrepreneurs have risen to celebrity status and resort to exaggerating
their successes in order to garner more attention and more VC capital.
Theranos is a prime example of how a founder, enamored by VC investment
and the prospect of rapid growth, promised products that they were
ultimately unable to deliver upon. Theranos claimed that they created a
miniaturized blood analyzer that would transform the blood testing industry.
However, Theranos’ scientific claims were neither tested nor verified. The
medical product did not function properly. Theranos’ founder, Elizabeth
Holmes, rose to prominence quickly, gaining fame and media attention.
Internally, Theranos was different. The corporate culture did not value
transparency or compliance, and instilled fear and secrecy. Theranos did not
heed customer complaints about the flawed inaccurate blood test results.
Moreover, employees who spoke up about questionable ethical practices
were ignored and often fired. Theranos’s founder grossly misrepresented the
success of the product, resorting to hyping itself up, in order to continue to
receive support and funding from investors. No one was willing to question
Theranos’ product; not even Walgreens, which spent millions of dollars to
work with Theranos.52 The power of the entrepreneurial celebrity status is so
compelling that it can persuade companies like Walgreens to forego due
52. Rashmi Airan, Theranos Scandal Highlights Need for Effective Corporate
Governance, Rashmi (June 8, 2018), https://www.rashmiairan.com/theranos-scandal-highli
ghts-need-for-effective-corporate-governance/.
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diligence just to have access to a popular technology.53 Fear of disappointing
the investors, not developing the product fully, and focusing on what the
product could be instead of what it was caused it to fail.54
Although Theranos is an extreme example, there are many startups like
Theranos in their initial stages, who possess strong talent, solid ideas, and a
thriving business. To grow, they resort to exaggerations about their products,
hype themselves up and rely on bad business practices to gain ludicrously
high inaccurate valuations. As these fledgling startups continue to grow,
these bad business practices become ingrained in their corporate culture.
This type of growth coupled with more capital than a startup needs can lead
startups to grow their businesses to scale with only short-term goals in mind,
ending in burnout. For example, Homejoy, an on-demand home cleaning
services platform, completed a $38 million round of financing in a little over
a year.55 However, two years later in 2015, it shut down due to its failing
growth strategy. Rather than focusing on user retention of its services,
Homejoy was focused on customer acquisition since VCs cared about rapid
growth.56 And rapid growth for platform companies means gaining a larger
number of customers. Homejoy relied heavily on discounting their cleaning
services as a means of getting more customers.57 But this strategy was very
costly and came at the expense of little revenue and minimal customer
retention. Homejoy also was unable to create a consistent high-quality
service and was burdened by lawsuits due to compliance issues regarding
worker classification.58 Before it could be acquired, Google poached the
engineers and talent team. Thus, in the long term, bad corporate governance
inhibits startups’ ability to achieve good quality growth. With such high
valuations, a volatile market, and the burden of compliance, companies are
positioned for an M&A or dissolution. And before dissolution can occur, as
it did for Homejoy, VCs pressure startups to sell while their products have
not yet been duplicated by tech giants and they are still “hot” on the tech
scene.
To pursue this point further, even when companies are on a strong track,
VCs pressure for exit through an acquisition as seen in the case of harmon.ie,
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Alex Moazed, How to Avoid Crashing and Burning Like This $150 Million
Company, INC.COM (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.inc.com/alex-moazed/3-tips-to-avoidcrashing-and-burning-a-150-million-startup.html.
56. Id.
57. Christina Farr, Why Homejoy Failed, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.wired.
com/2015/10/why-homejoy-failed/.
58. Id.
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a software tech startup creating collaboration tools.59 At the end of the VCs
seven-year investment cycle, the VC expected harmon.ei to sell in order to
return profit to their limit-partner investors. The co-founder and CEO pushed
back against an exit, believing it to be premature and not in line with the
interests of the startup in the long term.60 The VCs interest in selling is driven
by their fiduciary duties to their investors and tied to the lifecycle of the
investment. Thus, the priority is often VC profit and interests, rather than
innovation, quality of the product, sustainability of the business, and
customer welfare.61 In response to this demand, harmon.ie turned to banks
for loans to buy out the VC shares and gain their independence. This case
illustrates VCs obsession with an exit, driven by the lifecycle of their
investment, and their fiduciary duties to their limited partners.
Part 2. Legal Framework
Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and promote
healthy vigorous competition. It serves as a check against companies who
have monopolistic power and use it to suppress competition. Monopoly
power is defined as the “power to control prices or exclude competition.”62
The Court acknowledges that antitrust doctrine is not static but is “constantly
evolving with new circumstances and wisdom.”63 Currently, the sheer
amount of M&As in the technology space signifies an alarming rise in the
level of concentration, and the disproportionate allocation of market power
to a small number of companies.
Robust M&A activity, in part, stems from VCs inducing startups to
position themselves for an acquisition. The data demonstrates that venture
capitalists are more incentivized to actualize their investment by selling
rather than going public through IPO.64 More startups heavily rely on VC
funding and venture capitalists look to M&A to generate growth and
entrepreneurship. Additionally, VC funding plays a huge role in the

59. Rosalie Chan, A Startup’s VCs Were Pressuring the Company to Sell Itself So
Employees Bought Out the VCs Instead. The CEO Explains Why He’s Done with Venture
Investors, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/harmonie-ceoyaacov-cohen-explains-why-employees-bought-outs-its-vcs-2019-4.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905 (2007).
64. GORDON M. PHILLIPS & ALEXEI ZHDANOV, VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND
MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY AROUND THE WORLD, 1, 1 (2018).
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professionalization of startups.65 Empirical results demonstrate that while
13.74% of exits are IPOs, mergers constituted 76.61% of exits.66 According
to Prequin data on exits, M&A embody almost six times the incidence of
IPO. The implications of this is that mergers are a viable and preferred exit
strategy. The fact that M&A waves, not IPO waves predict VC behavior
further illustrates the connection between VCs and M&A activity.67
Merger policy is lenient regarding potential competition mergers.
Historically, the FTC and DOJ primarily focused on mergers and
acquisitions between established firms. However, this does not accurately
reflect the current economic reality. In the technology market, the majority
of acquisitions occur between a tech giant and an emerging small startup. At
face value, these acquisitions do not appear anticompetitive because the
relative market share is small. On the contrary, these acquisitions harm the
technology industry in the long term and lead to higher levels of
concentration. The outcome is high barriers to entry, decreasing population
of technology companies, diminishing innovation, and monopolistic tech
companies yielding dominance over consumers. Preventative merger control
policy fosters a fair environment for competition and entrepreneurship to
flourish because it screens out the anticompetitive effects of these types of
acquisitions. This is especially crucial because emerging startups play a
critical role in spurring innovation, job creation, and productivity in the
economy.68 The governing law for mergers is the Clayton Act as well as the
Horizontal and Vertical Merger Guidelines.
The underlying theme of the Clayton Act Sec. 7 and its subsequent 1950
amendment is to combat the rising levels of concentration in American
industries.69 To establish a violation under the Clayton Act, the effect of an
acquisition of stock by one corporation of another may substantially lessen
competition or create a monopoly.70 Also, mergers which result in a
significant increase in concentration of firms in the market, and produce a
company with undue share of the relevant market, is inherently disposed to
substantially lessen competition.71 The Court reasoned that competition is
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 18–19.
68. Ryan Decker, et al., The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and Economic
Dynamics, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2014), http://econweb.umd.edu/~haltiwan/
jep_dhjm.pdf.
69. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963).
70. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
323 (1962).
71. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362–63.
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greatest when there are many sellers rather than a few who hold significant
market share.72 For purposes of merger analysis, the primary inquiry is
whether the proposed merger enhances market power or facilitates its
exercise.73 There are two main types of mergers74: 1) vertical, between
companies at different levels in the market75 2) horizontal, between direct
competitors.76 Historically, the FTC and the DOJ have challenged horizontal
mergers more vigorously than vertical mergers because the perceived risk to
competition is more apparent. Additionally, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
authorizes antitrust agencies to review mergers and their effects prior to the
completion of the merger.77
The first problem with the current law is that it focuses on price-setting,
which is an inadequate starting point for analysis in a world where services
are often free. Google’s online search engines and Facebook’s social media
are free for customers. Facebook became massive in the market because they
provided services and products consumers needed. Thus, the threshold
definition of market power and competition should be adjusted to account
for such innovations in the product market. The FTC should have challenged
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram in the same way that it
blocked the merger of Franklin Electric and United Dominion.78 In the
Franklin Electric and United Dominion case, both companies entered into a
joint venture agreement.79 It resembled a near monopoly as both companies
were the only two producers of submersible turbine pumps used for
gasoline.80 The DOJ found that entry would be difficult by other competitors
and that there would be no competition, thus it blocked the merger to prevent
the formation of a monopoly and prohibit anticompetitive effects.81

72. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
73. US. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (Aug.
19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf;
horizontal merger guidelines 3.0.
74. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guide to Antitrust Laws - Competitive Effects, https://www.
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects.
75. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-35 (1962).
77. Fed Trade Comm’n, Guide to Antitrust Laws – Mergers, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers.
78. Fed Trade Comm’n, Commentary on Horizontal Merger Guidelines 26, (2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergers/commentaryonthehorizontalmer
gerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Similarly, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram created
barriers to entry for other platform competitors.
The second issue with merger review is that it does not sufficiently
assess an acquisition’s potential risk profile. Due to these standards, many
acquisitions fall through the cracks of the merger review process and results
in tech companies blocking the formation and survival of new rival
companies. Facebook’s acquisitions of startups have created a virtual
monopoly leaving Facebook as the dominant company with high barriers to
entry for other viable competitors. Particularly revealing is the way in which
Facebook has utilized its acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp to
eliminate them from becoming potential competitors, kill Snapchat, and
block Vine from its API. In allowing the merger to occur, the FTC has
effectively lessened competition and potentially harmed consumers in the
future. Since data functions as a currency of control in the tech market, the
combined personal data of all three social application networks offers
Facebook a steady stream of revenue from advertisers,82 and blocks newer
social networks from forming. Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and
Instagram raises serious concerns about Facebook’s digital monopoly,
anticompetitive effects, and the impact on consumer welfare especially in
the area of digital security. Both WhatsApp and Instagram were vital
competitors alongside Facebook in the social media and messaging services
market. WhatsApp is a unique messaging service allowing people to stay
connected without bombarding them with ads while providing end-to-end
encryption security.83 Although the high-level platform integration from the
combination of Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook is convenient for users,
ultimately it limits consumer choices and impacts the quality of the
services.84 For example, the acquisition of WhatsApp threatened the unique
quality of the end-to-end encryption messaging feature. The chief executive
of WhatsApp, Jan Koum, resigned after the recent Cambridge Analytica
scandal which further revealed the flaws in Facebook’s data collection
services, as well as the weaknesses of their privacy and security policies. If
WhatsApp and Instagram continued to compete independently Facebook in
82. John Shinal, How Mark Zuckerberg Has Used Instagram to Crush Evan Spiegel’s
Snap, CNBC (July 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/12/how-mark-zuckerberg-hasused-instagram-to-crush-evan-spiegels-snap.html.
83. Anthony Cuthbertson, Why Facebook Might Be About to Ruin WhatsApp,
INDEPENDENT (May 1, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/featu
res/facebook-whatsapp-change-privacy-encryption-messaging-app-jan-koum-a8330626.html.
84. Makena Kelly, Facebook’s Messaging Merger Leaves Lawmakers Questioning the
Company’s Power, THE VERGE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/28/18
200658/facebook-messenger-instagram-whatsapp-google-congress-markey-blumenthal-scha
tz-william-barr-doj-ftc.
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the social/media messaging market, Facebook would have been compelled
to innovate and increase the security and privacy quality of their services.85
Furthermore, Facebook’s motivations for attempting to acquire
Snapchat, and its response when its proposal got rejected indicates another
reason why VCs induce their startups to sell. Snapchat entered in the social
network space, attracting customers and businesses across the spectrum with
millions of daily active users.86 Facebook recognized that Snapchat could
pose a potential threat because it was continuing to attract users, and content
usually posted on Facebook or Instagram, would be posted on Snapchat
first.87 In order to quell this competition, they offered to purchase Snapchat
for $3 billion in 2013.88 And when Snapchat rejected Facebook’s offer,
Facebook copied and added a version of Snapchat’s Stories features on
WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook networks.89 Facebook also copied and
built upon Snapchat’s face filters and disappearing messages features. It is
important to note that while the Stories feature appeared in all three social
networking apps, it was only really successful on Instagram. Facebook
struggled to integrate the Stories Feature into their app and had to resort to
giving Instagram users the ability to double-post on Instagram and
Facebook.90 They even created Facebook Poke, an app intended to mirror
Snapchat’s features and crush Snapchat.91 However, it failed.92 Without its
acquisition of Instagram, Facebook would not have been able to stunt
Snapchat’s growth and surpass Snapchat’s millions of daily active users.
Thus, Facebook’s acquisition gave them the ability to gain dominance in the
social network space, not by sheer efficiency but by copying all of
Snapchat’s features and incorporating these features with its acquisition of
Instagram. Facebook’s retaliatory actions contributed to Snapchat’s falling
valuation. Many developing startups, like Snapchat, may not be willing to
sell. However, although Snapchat survived Facebook’s copying tactics, most

85. Id.
86. Billy Gallagher. How Facebook Tried to Squash Snapchat, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/copycat-how-facebook-tried-to-squash-snapchat/.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Gallagher, supra note 86.
90. Chris Welch, No One is Using Facebook Stories, So Facebook is Borrowing
Instagram’s, THE VERGE (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/6/16264166/
facebook-stories-fail-instagram-please-help.
91. Seth Fiegerman, Snapchat CEO Reveals Why He Rejected Facebook’s $3 Billion
Offer, MASHABLE (Jan. 6, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/01/06/snapchat-facebook-acqui
sition-2/#ANROAAMpWZqK.
92. Id.
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startups may not have the scale, funding or time to respond to aggressive
tactics. Because of this, when startups are approached for acquisition, VCs
will be even more motivated to sell rather than undertake a risk that a tech
giant will swoop in, copy the technology and significantly lower the value of
the startup.
The third problem is that lenient merger policies give rise to increased
market concentration and consolidation which creates opportunities for tech
giants to acquire a larger consumer base and veer closer to monopolization.93
To illustrate, Amazon’s acquisition of Twitch, a video game streaming
service, means that they can market to Twitch’s viewer base.94 Additionally,
Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods permits them to gain unique shopping
data which Amazon can use to expand into the online grocery business.95
Customer insights are the key to dominating a larger consumer base,
attaining more economic influence and power. For this reason, Amazon can
target ads and narrowly tailor shopping experiences more efficiently than
typical companies in the grocery business.96 Namely, Amazon would be able
to utilize the cross-platform data to target consumers with its own
commercial products and sponsored products. This business expansion is not
derived from natural development or growth, but from willful acquisition.
Such a phenomenon is not limited to Amazon. Google’s search engine
processes around three billion searches each day. Amazon has approximately
197 million unique visitors a month while Facebook has roughly 2.32 billion
active users each month.97 As tech giants consolidate and acquire smaller
startups, they create a plethora of services from these deals to dominate the
digital arena, driving these tech giants closer to near monopolization. This is
evident in the way Facebook is cutting off access to its social networking
platforms. Socials networks platforms are intended to be open, and increase
connectivity by encouraging double-posting, finding contacts, and sharing
various types of contents. Facebook blocked Vine’s access by preventing

93. Asher Schechter, Is There a Concentration Problem in America, STIGLER CTR.,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (May 2018), https://promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IsThere-a-Concentration-Problem-in-America.pdf.
94. Sandra Lee, Tech Companies are Consolidating like Crazy, UNIVERSITY OF SANTA
BARBARA – THE BOTTOM LINE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://thebottomline.as.ucsb.edu/2019/03/
tech-companies-are-consolidating-like-crazy.
95. Lauren Hirsch, A Year after Amazon Announced Whole Foods Deal Here’s Where
We Stand, CNBC (June 15, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/a-year-after-amazonannounced-whole-foods-deal-heres-where-we-stand.html.
96. Id.
97. Lee, supra note 94.
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Vine users from locating their Facebook Friends who use the Vine app.98 In
doing so, Facebook makes it difficult for new social networking platforms to
emerge.99 Not only will this function as a huge barrier to expand the user
base, but startups working with this limitation will likely aim to get acquired
since competition with dominant networks is not realistic.100 Additionally,
even if startups created an innovative tool, it can be easily duplicated. VCs
would be further motivated to position the startup for acquisition, and not
IPO.
Part 3. Potential Remedy
The FTC should take a more dynamic and forceful approach to merger
review. By taking enforcement actions against mergers in the high-tech
startup space, it will alter to some extent VC preference for mergers as a
viable exit strategy. The FTC’s merger review policy has no bite as indicated
by data demonstrating that between 1996 and 2012, the FTC did not
challenge mergers that resulted in five or more remaining firms.101 Antitrust
laws were designed to stop network monopolies.102 The tech giants of today
are monopolizing the digital tech space through vertical integration and
swallowing up startups before they can lay a claim to the digital tech market.
Thus, the FTC and the DOJ should step in and strengthen their enforcement
actions against mergers as it has done so before.
First, the FTC should place more emphasis on enforcing guidelines
more strongly in order to prevent potentially anticompetitive mergers from
happening. As an illustration, AT&T forfeited its proposed acquisition of TMobile when the DOJ filed an antitrust suit in an attempt to block the
merger.103 Here, enhanced merger enforcement not only compelled a change
in AT&T’s behavior, but improved competition in the long term for wireless
98. Molly McHugh, How Social Networks Are Ruining Social Networks, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/facebook-cuts-off-access-tovine/.
99. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Emails Show Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved
Facebook’s Decision to Cut Off Vine’s Access to Data, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:53
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-documents-mark-zuckerberg-restricted-vin
e-data-access-2018-12.
100. McHugh, supra note 98.
101. Asher Schechter, Is There A Concentration Problem in America?, (Guy Rolnik
2018); supra note 95.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, Council of Economic
Advisers Issue Brief (Apr. 14, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf.
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carrier services. The DOJ argued that the merger was harmful to consumer
welfare because it would reduce competition in the mobile carrier’s sector,
decrease innovation, and result in higher prices with poorer quality
services.104 Both AT&T and T-Mobile competed nationally and locally as
T-Mobile had positioned itself as a disruptor in the market, offering high
quality, low price accessible smartphones to the average American
consumer. The merger would eliminate T-Mobile as a competitor and
significantly reduce competition.105 Thus, any efficiency arising from the
merging parties’ proposal did not offset the considerable adverse effects on
consumers and competition in the industry.106 Had the merger proposal
succeeded, smaller providers would not be able to survive or enter into the
market because of the combined network power of AT&T and T-Mobile.
Furthermore, the mobile carrier services industry would suffer from a lack
of innovation and a suite of versatile mobile services that T-Mobile had
achieved. Namely, T-Mobile introduced the first Android phone, Blackberry
email and Sidekick.107 The merger would eliminate T-Mobile’s lower priced
data and voice plans. It otherwise would not have incentivized big market
players like AT&T, Verizon, or Sprint to continue to innovate and transform
mobile services as they have done today.108 Without the merger, T-Mobile
could not have partnered with MetroPCS or challenged Sprint’s Family plans
with their own modified family plans. 109 The DOJ’s strong stance against
this particular acquisition served to promote competition and the continued
innovation of mobile contracts and services.
CDK Global Inc.’s (“CDK”) proposed acquisition of Auto/Mate is
another merger that the FTC took action against, causing CDK to abandon
the merger. Both parties in the merger are competitors functioning as

104. Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of TMobile, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-depart
ment-files-antitrust-lawsuit-block-att-s-acquisition-t-mobile.
105. U.S. v. AT&T Inc., T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, U.S. D. OF
COLUM., https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/487776/download.
106. Justice Department Files Antitrust Lawsuit to Block AT&T’s Acquisition of TMobile, supra note 104.
107. U.S. v. AT&T Inc., T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Mark Rogowsky, There’s Be No Wireless Wars Without the Blocked T-Mobile
Merger, So Where Does That Leave Comcast-TWC?, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014, 7:52 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2014/08/27/t-mobile-and-sprint-continue-to-ba
ttle-thanks-to-the-government/#511efa563160.
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franchise dealer management systems providers.110 Their business software
is used by vehicle dealerships for all aspects of business operations ranging
from HR, inventory to scheduling and accounting.111 CDK was one of two
largest competitors in the market. On the other hand, Auto/Mate was a
disruptor in the market through aggressive pricing and by offering
customized software updates. Auto/Mate was becoming a lethal competitor
to CDK, thus CDK sought to acquire it at a price excessively higher than
Auto/Mate’s valuation.112 The consummation of the merger would result in
reduced competition through high concentration an dominance of the dealer
management services franchise product market, stifled innovation and lower
quality services.113 The FTC recognized the harm it could bring to the market
and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the parties from completing
the merger.114 Shortly after, CDK withdrew its merger proposal.115
Competition and innovation was preserved in the market. Here, the FTC saw
that even though Auto/Mate itself had a comparatively small market share,
it had the potential to gain a significant share of the market. The FTC’s action
demonstrates that they possess the power to change the economic behavior
of firms seeking to acquire potential competitors. Additionally, it illustrates
that the FTC can be successful in high tech cases even where there is no
clear-cut high market share of one party in the merger.
Second, the FTC and DOJ should analyze potential mergers in light of
their impact on innovation.116 For the tech market, price as a metric of
anticompetitive behavior is insufficient because tech companies often offer
their services for free. Additionally, the benefit of an acquisition does not
rest upon the ability to raise or lower prices, but the ability to gain access to
technology and consumer data. However, a difficulty with innovation effects
is that it may be hard to identify the true competitors at the time of the
transaction. For example, when Facebook first proposed to merge with

110. In the Matter of CDK Global, Inc., et al., Docket No. 9382, Order Dismissing
Complaint, (Mar. 26, 2018) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/docket_no_
9382_cdk_automate_part_3_complaint_redacted_public_version_0.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. FTC Challenges CDK Global, Inc.’s Proposed Acquisition of Competitor Auto/Mate,
Inc., Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2018/03/ftc-challenges-cdk-global-incs-proposed-acquisition-competitor.
115. Id.
116. John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy
and Practice, (Oct. 9, 2018), at 37, available at https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf.
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WhatsApp and Instagram, federal regulators could not determine if there
would be anticompetitive effects because the products were not perceived to
be actual substitutes. To mitigate such uncertainties with identifying harmful
mergers, regulators should take into account how technology products fit
with each other, and the position of startups in the tech market. A startup’s
role in the tech market is to be a disruptor to the benefit of the customer. If a
startup gets acquired, it is essentially eliminated from competing against
incumbent tech firms. This leads to stagnation of innovation because startups
will not have the opportunity to innovate new technology, create business
models or push other companies to innovate.117 With VCs positioning
startups for acquisition, startups may not be able to fulfil their roles in
generating more competition and innovation. VCs prefer the M&A exit
strategy because M&As are rarely challenged. Antitrust regulation focusing
on innovation effects challenges more tech acquisitions, which could
disincentivize the VC preference for M&A exit strategies in the long run.

Conclusion
Antitrust protects competition, not competitors.118 Not all mergers are
the enemy of competition. For example, a merger between two small startups
to enable them to compete effectively against dominant players is valid.119
Similarly, a merger between a financially stable company and company
which is failing, does not impede competition.120 However, a merger which
tends to substantially lessen competition will adversely affect competition.
Such mergers are becoming more prevalent in the startup ecosystem as a
preferred exit strategy due to VC pressures. VCs are driven by their fiduciary
duties to realize the investment within the investment period. Often, this brief
period is not adequate enough for startups to scale sustainably and build a
quality product. During each stage of VC financing, VCs gain significant
ownership and power over startup operations and corporate governance. VCs
push for growth as a measure of success, thereby causing rapid low-quality
growth that sacrifices legal compliance. As the investment period draws
near, VCs pressure startups to sell rather than continuing to support them
financially or encouraging them to do the IPO route. The pressure to sell is
further enhanced by poor corporate governance policies which make it

117. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#2f.
118. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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extremely costly to be compliant by public firm standards. Furthermore, VCs
fear falling valuations stemming from the tech giants potentially duplicating
the startup’s idea or from a fear that the startup will no longer be a hot topic,
and thus their goal is to prematurely sell at the highest valuation they can.
This prevents startups from becoming vital competitors as disruptors in the
tech market and gives tech giants leverage to acquire the companies to
maintain their dominance.
In order to incentivize investors from relying heavily upon the M&A
exit strategy, there needs to be more forceful merger control policy.
Although the FTC and DOJ do not always prevail in blocking an acquisition,
the mere fact that take enforcement action has been enough to compel
companies to abandon the merger or draw scrutiny to industry practices is a
positive development. For instance, the DOJ filed a lawsuit to block AT&T’s
proposed acquisition of Time Warner for $85 billion.121 Ultimately, this
effort did not prevail, but it did send a message to tech companies that the
government is able to hold companies accountable and is willing to apply the
same force to tech giants who are acquiring emerging promising startups.122
To effectively fortify the position of antitrust enforcement actions, the
agencies and courts should incorporate the following substantive
approaches: 1) focus more heavily on market impacts of innovation,
potential competition, and barriers to entry 2) bring more antitrust actions
against technology companies as a deterrence measure and 3) adopt a
cautious approach to approving mergers. The combination of these
approaches permits the DOJ and FTC to block anticompetitive mergers,
thereby cultivating a precedent for stricter scrutiny of acquisitions.
Essentially, it will be more difficult for mergers to pass DOJ and FTC
standards. VCs and M&A waves correspond with each other and these
remedies may alter to an extent, VC behavior towards startups, encouraging
them to consider other exit strategies or longer-term investments.

121. Klint Finley, Government Move to Block AT&T Merger Bodes III for Big Tech,
WIRED (Nov. 21, 2017, 6 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/government-move-to-blockatandt-merger-bodes-ill-for-tech/.
122. Id.

